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Despite strong scientific evidence and representations made by international scientific 
organizations, a considerable number of countries have imposed import bans on pork 
in response to the H1N1 pandemic. The imposition of these barriers is contrary to 
WTO rules. The motivation for the imposition of these barriers does not appear to have 
arisen from producers’ requests or consumer lobbying – political precaution provides 
the motivation. There appears to be little control over political precaution in the rules 
of international trade. Hence, the balance between the strong rules of trade desired by 
firms wishing to engage in international commerce and the need, at times, for 
politicians to respond to requests for protection may be changing in favour of more 
protection.   
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Introduction 
Chinese President Hu Jintao Tuesday ordered the country to step up 
inspection and quarantine measures to prevent swine flu from entering 
China and ensure public health and safety.... 
 
China’s Agriculture Ministry and quality watchdog issued a joint notice on 
Monday suspending all imports of live pigs or products containing pork 
from Mexico and the US states of Texas, California and Kansas. 
       China View, April 28, 2009 
[T]he imposition of ban measures related to the import of pigs and pig 
products from countries with human cases of A/H1N1 are pointless and do 
not comply with international standards published by the OIE and all other 
competent standard setting international bodies for animal health and food 
safety....  
World Organization for Animal 
Health, Press Release, June 11, 
2009 
t is sometimes appropriate to stand back and revisit some basic questions such as: 
Why do countries negotiate trade agreements? In the first instance, trade 
agreements are negotiated to reduce the uncertainty associated with capricious 
restrictions on market access for firms which wish to invest in international 
commercial activities.
1 In essence, trade agreements establish rules that put limits on 
the ability of governments to impose barriers to market access (and other trade-
distorting policies). While the benefits of reducing trade barriers are often discussed in 
terms of welfare enhancement, the crux of the matter is whether firms that see a 
profitable opportunity in international commerce feel that their investments in such 
activities are sufficiently secure to allow the investments to go forward. From a firm’s 
perspective there are few things that are more devastating than building up a foreign 
market only to have access to that market restricted due to the actions of a foreign 
government. While international commercial activities are often risky endeavours, 
there are a large number of institutional arrangements in the private sector that can 
mitigate many of the risks that are unique to international commerce (i.e., 
international private arbitration, documentary letters of credit to ensure payment, etc.) 
(Kerr and Perdikis, 2003). The activities of governments that impact upon 
international commerce, for the most part, must be dealt with through agreements 
among states. 
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While the activities of governments can increase the uncertainty associated with 
international commerce and, hence, reduce its level, it has also long been recognized 
that these risks cannot be eliminated. This is because politicians may wish to put trade 
restrictions in place for domestic political reasons. While many firms might prefer to 
have the ability of politicians to impose trade restrictions eliminated, there is a 
realization that politicians would be loath to agree. The next best alternative is to have 
a set of transparent and predictable rules for when and how governments can intervene 
to limit market access. While firms might like to see tariffs removed, if tariff rates are 
transparent and the mechanism whereby they can be changed is predictable, firms can 
make informed decisions about supplying a market. Thus, at any point in time, trade 
agreements represent the current compromise between the desires of firms engaging in 
international commerce for strong limitations on the ability of governments to impose 
trade restrictions and the desires of politicians to be able to impose trade restrictions in 
response to domestic requests for protection. Of course, trade agreements are 
constructed such that any ceding of sovereignty is temporary and commitments can be 
broken if the domestic politics is judged to be too difficult. In the case of the latter, 
choosing to ignore previously agreed commitments is not costless. For example, the 
member states of the World Trade Organization have agreed that countries injured by 
another country not living up to its commitments are entitled to compensation or 
allowed to retaliate. For the most part, however, countries tend live up to their 
commitments.
2 
In the case of trade barriers imposed on sanitary and phytosanitary grounds, the 
current multilateral compromise is embodied in the WTO’s Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (Isaac, 2007). 
To impose trade barriers justified on these grounds, there must be a scientific reason 
for the measure. According to Isaac (2007, 385), “The science-based measures 
adopted must be proportional to the risk that is being targeted.” The WTO, however, 
does not determine the sufficiency of the scientific evidence. Instead, the member 
states agreed that they would defer to three international scientific organizations – the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for food safety, the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant safety and the World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE)
3 for animal health and safety. Sufficient scientific evidence “would be 
evidence that conforms to either the standards or the standards-setting procedures 
established by these organizations” (Isaac 2007, 385).  
The SPS Agreement was put into the WTO during the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Prior to the Uruguay Round, trade in agricultural 
products was largely exempt from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade William A. Kerr 
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(GATT) through the granting of waivers. It was agreed during the Uruguay Round that 
agricultural products should be subject to GATT disciplines.
4 There was a worry, 
however, that governments, faced with new disciplines on their ability to restrict trade 
in agricultural products, would search for alternative means to respond to domestic 
requests for economic protection. Nefarious SPS measures were an obvious avenue 
for providing protection (Gaisford and Kerr, 2001). The SPS Agreement, with its 
scientific basis, was the mechanism chosen to close off this avenue. The agreement 
was designed with requests for protection from domestic producer interests in mind. 
The SPS Agreement has, however, proved to be controversial because it does not 
make any provisions for governments to respond to other groups in society (e.g., 
consumers or environmentalists) that might ask for protection and who do not accept 
the scientific consensus upon which the criteria were to be based (Isaac and Kerr, 
2003). In the H1N1 pandemic of 2009, a new form of protectionism has come to the 
fore which calls into question the commitment of governments to the rule of law in 
international trade and considerably increases the risks firms face in the international 
commercial environment. 
 
H1N1 and Trade Restrictions 
wine influenza (or the A/H1N1 virus–based human disease) was first reported in 
the Federal District of Mexico City on March 18, 2009. The number of cases in 
Mexico increased steadily over the next few weeks and, subsequently, cases were 
reported in the United States and Canada. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
issued its first situation update on April 24, 2009. By that time, in Mexico there were 
over 850 cases and there had been almost 60 deaths. The WHO’s situation update 
(WHO, 2009, April 24) outlined why this particular strain of influenza warranted 
close monitoring. 
 
The majority of these cases have occurred in otherwise healthy young 
adults. Influenza normally affects the very young and the very old, but 
these age groups have not been heavily affected in Mexico.  
Because there are human cases associated with an animal influenza virus, 
and because of the geographical spread of multiple community outbreaks, 
plus the somewhat unusual age groups affected, these events are of high 
concern. 
The Swine Influenza A/H1N1 viruses characterized in this outbreak have 
not been previously detected in pigs or humans. 
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After this initial situation update, the WHO began issuing almost daily – 
sometimes twice-a-day – updates. The WHO’s second update, on April 25, 2009 
(WHO, 2009, April 25), concluded with “WHO is not recommending any travel or 
trade restrictions” (emphasis added). In its third update, on April 27, 2009, the WHO 
stated, “There is also no risk of infection from this virus from consumption of well-
cooked pork and pork products” (WHO, 2009, April 27). Thus, right from the outset 
the WHO had issued clear statements about both the issue of trade restrictions and the 
relationship of the human disease to pork products. These statements were repeated in 
subsequent updates. In their 11th update, on May 3, 2009, the WHO made its first 
reference to any relationship between live swine and the human disease (WHO, 2009, 
May 3): 
 
Canada on 2 May reported the identification of the A(H1N1) virus in a 
swine herd in Alberta. It is highly probable that the pigs were exposed to 
the virus from a Canadian farm worker recently returned from Mexico, 
who had exhibited flu-like symptoms and had contact with the pigs. There 
is no indication of virus adaptation through transfer from human to pigs at 
this time.   
 
On April 30, 2009 the International Food Safety Authorities Network 
(INFOSAN), under the joint authority of two United Nations Organizations – the 
WHO and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) – issued an updated 
Information Note explaining the relationship between the swine disease and the 
human disease (INFOSAN, 2009): 
 
Swine influenza, per se, is not an OIE listed disease and there is currently 
no justification in the OIE Animal Health Standards Code for the 
imposition of trade measures on the importation of pigs or their products. 
However, if Influenza A/H1N1 virus would be shown to cause disease in 
animals, virus circulation could worsen the regional and global situation 
for public health. These assessments will inform possible decisions 
regarding implementation of movement restrictions of pigs in affected 
regions and underpin any decisions regarding trade restrictions relative to 
live pigs. 
Swine influenza viruses do not normally infect humans. However, 
outbreaks and sporadic human infection with SIVs have been occasionally 
reported and serosurveys have demonstrated exposure of humans in certain 
risk groups. Most commonly, infection occurs in people in direct and close 
contact with pigs such as farm and abattoir workers. Onward transmission 
of SIVs among people in close contact with each other has occurred on a William A. Kerr 
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few occasions. Human influenza viruses have also been transmitted from 
people to pigs. 
Transmission among and between pigs and humans is likely to occur 
through direct or indirect contact with respiratory secretions or inhaling 
large droplets or aerosols spread through coughing and sneezing. The 
clinical picture of SIV infection in people is generally similar to that of 
human seasonal influenza. It is likely that most people, especially those 
who do not have regular contact with pigs, do not have immunity to SIVs 
and thus would be susceptible to SIV infection, although cross-protectivity 
studies are ongoing to explore this question further. Currently, there is no 
vaccine to protect people from SIV infection. 
 
While the language is careful, the implications are clear. Swine influenza is a 
normal disease in pigs and is not considered a sufficient economic risk to swine 
populations to justify trade restrictions on the international movement of pigs. While 
the risk to humans of contracting swine flu from pigs is non-zero, it is likely confined 
to individuals who work closely with the animals. The general population does not 
face any discernible risk. In addition, there is the strong statement – probably the 
strongest statement one could get from an international scientific organization – from 
the OIE that begins this paper, stating bluntly that import barriers imposed on pigs and 
pork products from countries reporting the human disease were pointless and in 
contravention of international standards. Thus, the message from the scientific 
community was consistent and unequivocal. There was no justification for the 
imposition of trade barriers. 
On April 30, 2009 it was reported
5 that the WHO had issued a list of twenty 
countries that, despite this strong, consistent and early message, had imposed bans on 
the importation of live pigs and pork products from a variety of countries reporting 
cases of the H1N1 human disease. Nine of the countries listed are not members of the 
WTO – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, 
Serbia and the United Arab Emirates – and, hence, are not bound by WTO 
commitments pertaining to having a scientific basis for the imposition of barriers and 
an assessment of the risks. The other eleven countries – Bahrain, China, Croatia, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Jordan, Philippines, Suriname, Switzerland, Thailand and Ukraine 
are members of the WTO. As of April 30, 2009, only Ukraine had notified the WTO 
of its measures – an import ban on pork from Mexico and the U.S. states of California, 
Texas and Kansas. While Switzerland was on the WHO’s list as having a ban on 
importation of pork from Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and the United States, it was 
reported that a spokesman from the Swiss Federal Veterinary Office said there are no William A. Kerr 
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pork or meat bans in place in response to the H1N1 virus (Thomson Reuters, 2009, 
May 4, 17:15:22 GMT).
6 
The May 18
th , 2009 WHO situation report shows an additional twenty countries 
having imposed trade restrictions on the basis of H1N1 (WHO, 2009, May 18) – 
Armenia, Barbados, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Moldova, St. 
Lucia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Venezuela and Zambia. At the same time, a few countries 
were lifting previously imposed restrictions on imports. From the perspective of pork 
exporting firms, this is exactly the sort of arbitrary imposition of import barriers that 
trade agreements are negotiated and designed to prevent. There was no scientific 
justification for imposing the import bans, nor had risk assessments been undertaken. 
The import restrictions were put in place with little notification and no consultation, 
leading to in-transit shipments being refused. Certainly there was a degree of 
understandable consumer confusion surrounding the relationship between something 
called swine flu and contact with pigs and/or consumption of pork, but this could have 
been overcome through education.  
What’s in a Name? 
n its situation updates of April 26, 27 and 28th, the WHO referred to the outbreak 
as “swine influenza”. That abruptly changed on April 29th, when the update was 
headed “Influenza A(H1N1)”. That heading has been used on all subsequent updates. 
The WHO undertook the re-branding of swine flu due to the negative impacts the 
name was having on the pork industry: 
 
The World Health Organization announced Thursday it will would stop 
using the term “swine flu” to avoid confusion over the danger posed by 
pigs. The policy shift came a day after Egypt began slaughtering thousands 
of pigs in a misguided effort to prevent swine flu. 
WHO spokesman Dick Thompson said the agriculture industry and the 
U.N. food agency had expressed concerns that the term “swine flu” was 
misleading consumers and needlessly causing countries to ban pork 
products and order the slaughter of pigs. 
“Rather than calling this swine flu ... we’re going to stick with the 
technical scientific name H1N1 influenza A,” Thompson said. (The 
Weekly Journal of Rural America, May 1, 2009). 
 
 
I William A. Kerr 
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Thus began a major effort to separate in consumers’ (and presumably politicians’) 
minds the human disease from the disease that is present in pig populations. While a 
reasonable policy response given the circumstances, it is a clear indication that the 
efficacy of scientific argument as an underpinning of public policy is on the wane and 
that gaining control of the message in the formal and informal
7 media – through its 
manipulation if necessary – is becoming increasingly important. Instead of explaining 
that pigs and pork do not pose a threat, rather alter the perception so that the disease is 
not associated with pigs. If scientific information is not important, however, the 
wisdom of having science as a major pillar of trade policy is called into question. The 
crux of this question, however, lies with political decision makers and  
who or what influences their decisions. 
 
Will Political Precaution Become a Pandemic? 
Political precaution has been defined as arising 
 
when politicians are being pressured to “do something”, or to be “seen to 
be doing something” in the face of strongly expressed concerns by 
members of civil society even when risks are very low or largely 
speculative (Kerr, 2004). 
 
Requests for protection are most often expected from domestic producers seeking 
economic relief from strong foreign competition. There is no evidence that the trade 
barriers put in place due to the H1N1 pandemic arose in response to such requests. If 
anything, local pork producers did not want the additional media attention the 
imposition of trade barriers would have meant – and which could only strengthen the 
association of their pork products with the human disease in the minds of consumers. 
Of course, the imposition of trade barriers in this case will bring the normal benefit – 
an increase in price – and, hence, their removal may be resisted by vested interests in 
the country imposing the barriers. The agitation for the imposition of trade barriers, 
however, did not come from domestic producers. 
Consumers may also be the source of demands for trade barriers. As suggested 
above, there was a certain amount of consumer confusion and anxiety regarding 
whether consumption of pork or proximity to pigs could lead to an individual 
contracting the disease. A scan of the internet, however, does not indicate a 
groundswell of demand for closing borders to foreign pork and swine. Even after the 
closures, there was very little comment in favour of the import bans. William A. Kerr 
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The nature of the disease, however, left politicians with few opportunities to be 
“seen to be doing something” to protect their citizens. The initial reports of a large 
number of deaths of healthy young adults in Mexico – a result that differs 
considerably from the normally high-risk demographic groups in a flu epidemic (i.e., 
the very young and the elderly with other health problems) – differentiated H1N1 
from a more common seasonal flu. The WHO and local health officials had no 
explanation for this anomaly and, hence, had no specific health policy 
recommendations. Vaccines were under development – a process that could not be 
accelerated by political action. Monitoring was increased, but that is not the type of 
activity that assures the public that politicians are taking strong measures on their 
behalf. The prevailing official message from the health establishment was wait and  
see. The strongest proactive statement from the WHO was  
 
Individuals are advised to wash hands thoroughly with soap and water on a 
regular basis and should seek medical attention if they develop any 
symptoms of influenza-like illness (WHO, 2009, May 3). 
 
This is hardly a message that would assure the citizenry that political leaders had 
the situation firmly in their control. Given the degree of attention the pandemic was 
receiving in the media, and the considerable anxiety being displayed by the public, 
one can certainly understand political leaders desire to be seen to be doing something. 
It is, however, worrisome that the President of China would feel the need to engage in 
such precautionary activity.
8 Of course, the need to be seen to be doing something is 
particularly important in China due to the government’s attempts in the past to cover 
up avian flu outbreaks and other food safety problems (Liu, Hobbs and Kerr, 2009). 
Imposing trade barriers on pork imports is a relatively easy way to appear to be 
providing pro-active leadership in dealing with the threat of an H1N1 pandemic. Some 
countries also imposed quarantine on travellers from countries reporting infections, 
but as the number of countries reporting infections grew, the optics of locking up 
business travellers and tourists worsened and the dearth of human quarantine facilities 
made such precautions impractical. Banning imports of pigs and pork products posed 
no such difficulties. It seems clear that, in some countries, pigs and pork were a 
particularly easy target. In heavily Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Lebanon and Sudan, where pork consumption is 
forbidden for a large percentage of the population for religious reasons, imports were 
insignificant and an import ban would have the tacit support of large segments of 
society.  William A. Kerr 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   10 
 
While the need to put in place barriers to trade for reasons of political precaution 
is understandable, it raises questions about the role of scientific expertise in 
influencing decisions on international trade. It is inconceivable that competent 
veterinary authorities would have sanctioned the imposition of trade barriers. This is 
not a case where there is a degree of scientific disagreement as in some other cases 
where political precaution has come to the fore in trade policy making – such as 
import bans on genetically modified organisms (Isaac and Kerr, 2003). The message 
from the scientific community is both strong and consistent. The imposition of 
barriers despite the lack of a scientific basis means that either the politicians imposed 
the barriers over the opposition of their scientific authorities or the scientific 
authorities were unwilling to oppose the political leadership. Neither scenario bodes 
well for a science-based system for rules of trade. A vigorous diplomatic effort based 
in large measure on putting forth the scientific case does appear to have influenced 
some countries to lift their bans. 
The exercise of political precaution by more than thirty countries no doubt led to 
increased fears surrounding H1N1. The WHO’s initial list of twenty countries was 
widely reported in the press. It could not help but raise suspicions among the public 
across the globe – Why are countries imposing import bans?; Would they impose a 
ban if there were no risk?; Why don`t they trust the WHO? The net result would have 
been an increasing number of consumers removing pork from their diets and further 
calls for trade restrictions in countries that had chosen not to impose them.
9 While the 
imposition of the bans may have had the desired effect on citizens regarding their 
sentiments toward their political leadership, it could only have served to fuel their 
unwarranted fears and confusion over sources of information. If H1N1 returns with a 
vengeance in the fall of 2009, as appears to be the concern of health authorities, or 
when another confusingly named disease appears in the future, one wonders if 
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Conclusion 
ountries certainly have the option to bring a complaint forward to the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system, as the H1N1-related import bans were imposed 
without a scientific justification or a risk assessment.
10 The WTO disputes process, 
however, takes too long and is too cumbersome to deal with this type of capricious 
imposition of import bans. The damage has been done to exporters, and it is likely that 
the bans will be lifted long before a formal dispute could wend its way through the 
WTO disputes system. In any case, the WTO disputes system was not designed to deal 
with this type of trade policy making. Governments largely live up to their 
international commitments – flagrant flouting of the rules has been the exception. The 
rules, however, were agreed when scientific expertise was better respected and before 
the revolution in electronic media technology. Thus, no restraints on the exercise of 
political precaution were built into the rules. 
Trade policy makers and those with an interest in engaging in international 
commercial activities should be worried because, once it becomes apparent that 
barriers to imports can be imposed despite a scientific consensus to the contrary, the 
progress achieved in international trade rule making since the inception of the GATT 
may have been considerably eroded. The balance between the strong rules of trade 
desired by firms wishing to engage in international commerce and the need, at times, 
for politicians to respond to requests for protection may be changing in favour of more 
protection. 
CWilliam A. Kerr 
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1.  Of course, trade agreements can also deal with other policies that can distort 
international trade, such as subsidies. 
2.  The one notable exception is the European Union’s ban on the importation of beef 
produced using hormones, where the EU chose to accept retaliation rather than 
lift its ban in compliance with a WTO panel’s ruling – see Kerr and Hobbs (2005) 
for details of the case. Of course, countries interpret their commitments 
differently, leading to often lengthy disputes, appeals and delays in implementing 
WTO panel rulings. There may also be bilateral settlements negotiated by 
countries in a dispute. Thus, compliance or the resolution of a dispute may be far 
from instantaneous, but outright non-compliance remains an anomaly. 
3.  It is common to refer to the World Organization for Animal Health using its 
previous name, the International Office of Epizootics, and the acronym for the 
French language version of its title – Office International des Epizooties – OIE.  
4.  Albeit with a transition period in many cases. 
5.  See, for example, Thomson Reuters (2009, May 4, 7.23am) and Thomson Reuters 
(2009, May 4, 10:03am). At the time of writing I have not been able to verify the 
WHO as the source of the list either on the WHO website or through direct 
attempts to contact the organization. 
6.  At the time of writing, I have not been able to determine how this inconsistency 
has been resolved. It is important because of Switzerland’s status as a modern 
market economy and, thus, a model for other countries to emulate. It is also 
important because there are continuing reports in the media that Switzerland has 
banned imports of pork products despite its official denial. See, for example, The 
Pig Site (2009). 
7.  Such as internet blogs, social networking sites and chat rooms. 
8.  See the quote that began this paper. 
9.  See, The Pig Site (2009) for an example of pork producers asking for an import 
ban, in part because Switzerland had been reported as having put an import ban in 
place. This is why having Switzerland appear on the list of countries imposing a 
ban is so important – its presence adds credibility to the bans. While the Swiss 
government reacted swiftly, the unamended list remained accessible.   
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